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ABSTRACT Detection of Black Hole attacks is one of the most challenging and critical routing security 
issues in vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) and autonomous and connected vehicles (ACVs). Malicious 
vehicles or nodes may exist in the cyber-physical path on which the data and control packets have to be routed 
converting a secure and reliable route into a compromised one. However, instead of passing packets to a 
neighbouring node, malicious nodes bypass them and drop any data packets that could contain emergency 
alarms. We introduce an intelligent black hole attack detection scheme (IDBA) tailored to ACV. We consider 
four key parameters in the design of the scheme, namely, Hop Count, Destination Sequence Number, Packet 
Delivery Ratio (PDR), and End-to-End delay (E2E). We tested the performance of our IDBA against AODV 
with Black Hole (BAODV), Intrusion Detection System (IdsAODV), and EAODV algorithms. Extensive 
simulation results show that our IDBA outperforms existing approaches in terms of PDR, E2E, Routing 
Overhead, Packet Loss Rate, and Throughput. 
INDEX TERMS ACVs, VANETs, MANETs, Detection, Black Hole, AODV, Routing, Secure, 
Communication.
I. INTRODUCTION 
VANETs were approved by the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) in 2002 [1]. VANETs permit 
autonomous (self-driving or partial self-driving) vehicles to 
mutually exchange data packets and sensitive messages 
(emergency alarms) with other vehicles and roadside units 
(RSUs) in the form of Cooperative Awareness Messages 
(CAMs) [2],[3]. Three types of communication that exist in 
VANETs are vehicle to vehicle (V2V), vehicle to 
infrastructure (V2I), and infrastructure to infrastructure (I2I) 
as shown in Figure 1 [4]. VANETs seek to provide security 
measures and privacy and safety to vehicles and drivers by 
exchanging alarm messages and CAMs [5],[6]. Due to some 
properties of VANETs, they are vulnerable to various 
routing (network layer) attacks like Black Hole, Rushing, 
Denial of Service (DoS), and Grey hole [7]. VANETs exhibit 
characteristics like high mobility, dynamic topology, and 
unbound communication medium. These features make 
security a challenging issue for autonomous vehicles [8],[9]. 
    Autonomous vehicles are considered to be one of the 
greatest revolutions in the automobile and research industry 
[10]. They are equipped with On-Board Units (OBUs) and 
Application Units (AUs). These parts play a key role in 
communication between the vehicles and the RSUs to create 
and mutually exchange CAMs to decrease the number of 
accidents that could occur as a result of human mistakes [11]-
[14]. 
    VANETs are a sub-class of Mobile ad hoc networks 
(MANETs), inheriting most of their characteristics. The 
main similarity between them is the absence of a backbone 
infrastructure in the network for messages exchange. 
Moreover, the continuously changing topology is another 
common factor. The communication range between the 
nodes is also restricted, which means that each mobile node 
needs the assistance of intermediate nodes to send data 
towards the destination in a multi-hop fashion [15]. 
    Nevertheless, VANETs have several characteristics that 
vary from MANETs. The movement of nodes in MANETs 
 Author Name: Preparation of Papers for IEEE Access (February 2017) 
2  VOLUME XX, 2017 
is random while in VANETs, nodes are supposed to travel 
along the roads. Also, every vehicle is equipped with On-
Board Sensors. These sensors are used for obtaining the 
vehicles’ speed and location. Due to these characteristics, 
implementing secure routing in VANETs, which leads to 
secure communication is a challenging issue [16]-[19].  
    Ad hoc on Demand Distance Vector (AODV) is a 
renowned and mostly configured routing protocol for ad hoc 
networks. Two main control messages that AODV uses for 
route discovery are route request (RREQ) and route reply 
(RREP). When the source needs to send data to communicate 
with the destination, and a route is not available, then it 
floods RREQ messages to its neighbours. The Neighbours 
reply with RREP if they have the best path to the destination. 
If they do not have one, then they further flood RREQ to their 
neighbours and the route discovery process continues until 
RREQ reaches the destination or the intermediate node 
which has got the route. The source unicast data packets 
upon receipt of RREP. Although AODV offers reactive 
routing and route discovery, however, it lacks security 
features (AODV-RFC 3561). 
    There are a variety of attacks that can harm data 
communication. Some attacks are internal which are initiated 
by an authorized malicious vehicle and some are external 
that are launched by a non-authorized malicious vehicle. The 
attacks can also be categorized as passive such as 
eavesdropping and active in particular routing attacks that 
directly disrupts data communication. One of the routing 
attacks in the field of ad hoc networks is a Black Hole attack, 
shown in Figure 2. During a black hole attack, fake RREP is 
sent as responses to legitimate RREQ requests without 
consulting the routing table. The fake RREP craft parameters 
to the maximum value of the destination sequence number 
and the minimum available to the hop count. That makes an 
adversary to appear as the one preserving the best path to the 
destination. This is because AODV will interpret this node 
as the next hop in the path. The source which receives the 
fake RREP forwards all data packets to the Black Hole. 
These packets are then dropped instead of being forwarded 
to the destination [20]-[24]. 
    This attack might have devastating effects in VANETs as 
each data packet, which may include alarms as well as 
emergency messages, needs to be delivered to the destination 
within limited time constraints [25]-[28]. The higher the 
speed, the more dangerous the attack is, as dropping all or 
even some data packets in high dynamic scenarios causes 
failure in the end to end communication that can lead to 
accidents and fatalities.  
    A lot of research and experiments have been performed on 
the isolation and detection of Black Hole Attacks for 
MANETs through AODV. Due to many similarities that 
exist between MANETs and VANETs, solutions proposed 
for MANETs, are extended to VANETs by researchers [29]-
[31]. Since we are considering ACVs, which are a sub-class 
of VANETs and carry all of their features, solutions 
proposed in the literature can also be considered for ACVs. 
However, one crucial aspect of ACVs is autonomy, i.e. a 
reduction in the degree of human intervention in driving. 
When it comes to driverless cars the attack surface is 
expanded due to the different levels of control on car safety 
and operational functions than those controlled by drivers. 
Regarding this important factor, there is a big research gap 
in the field of ACVs. Keeping this aspect into consideration, 
solutions for the detection of Black Hole attacks that have 
already been proposed for MANETs and VANETs cannot be 
directly applied to ACVs. Rather, some improvements need 
to be made. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1. Basic VANET architecture 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2. The Black Hole Attack 
    In this paper, we propose a detection algorithm IDBA. All 
Parameters that Black Hole exploits are precalculated in this 
technique. To make the detection intelligent, 802.11p is used 
at the mac layer. Since 802.11p is employed for Intelligent 
Transport Systems (ITS), that is why any technique utilising 
802.11p would be named as intelligent by definition.
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Additionally, four main parameters that have never been 
combined for Black Hole detection are collectively 
configured in our security algorithm. These are Hop Count,  
Destination Sequence Number, Packet Delivery Ratio, and 
End-to-End delay. 
    The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section II 
gives existing works published in public literature. Section 
III gives mathematical modeling of the Black Hole attack. 
Section IV is based on the overall proposed methodology. In 
Section V, simulation results are given. Section VI presents 
the conclusions and future directions for research. 
 
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
Security is considered a main area of research in the domain 
of MANETs and VANETs. In the past years, various 
researchers took keen interest and gave several solutions for 
the improvement of security mechanisms in routing for Ad 
hoc Networks. Table 1  provides a brief overview of the 
comparison among the different state of the art Black Hole 
detection techniques. 
    In [32], Hortelano et al. elaborated on the watchdog 
mechanism for VANETs. In their mechanism, if source node 
A transmits some packets to intermediate node B, then A can 
verify if B forwarded the packets or not by continuously 
listening to node B’s transmission. Every vehicle utilises a 
trust neighbour level for each neighbour vehicle. This can be 
calculated by the ratio of the packets sent to a neighbour to 
packets that are forwarded by the neighbour. Hence if a 
malicious vehicle continuously drops packets and it reaches 
the calculated level, then it is declared as a Black Hole. 
    In [33], Delkesh et al. proposed a heuristic approach to 
detecting Black Hole attacks in MANETs. The technique was 
used for MANET but equally applies to VANET as this is a 
heuristic approach and offers a generalised scheme based on 
fake IP address crafting techniques. The technique is often 
used to send forged packets in the AODV route discovery. 
Since a Black Hole never consults its routing table before 
sending back a reply to the requesting node, as a result, a  
Black Hole is trapped by replying to the requested fake 
destination IP address which never existed in the network. In 
this way detection of both single and cooperative Black Hole 
attacks occurred. 
    In [34], Daeinabi et al. developed an algorithm that was 
based on car monitoring. In their solution, vehicles are 
grouped into different clusters led by a cluster head (CH) 
which is the most reliable car in each cluster. Whenever any 
vehicle joins the cluster, the verifier begins their scanning 
about the behaviors of the joined vehicle. If the verifier 
notices that the vehicle is continuously dropping packets, 
then it reports to CH. Subsequently, CH decreases the trust 
value of the vehicle and also informs the neighbours of the 
vehicle. If somehow that trust value becomes lesser than a 
pre-defined threshold, CH directly reports to a certificate 
authority (CA), and the CA adds the vehicle to the Black List. 
It then informs all the vehicles to stop communicating with 
that Black Listed node. The experimental result shows that 
the proposed solution can detect malicious attackers at very 
high movements. In [35] the prevention mechanism is added 
to [34], and the selection of the verifier is improved in [36].  
    In [35], Kadam et al. made improvements to the algorithm 
proposed in [34] by adding the prevention and isolation 
mechanism of a Black Hole from the network. Almost the 
entire algorithm proposed in [35] is the same as in [34]. The 
difference lies in the additional parameter used for the 
isolation of an attacker and the alarm used, which is 
contained in the identity of the malicious node broadcasted 
across the network. The proposed technique could prevent 
and detect attackers at high mobility compared to [34]. 
    In [36], Uzma et al. enhanced the detection mechanism 
proposed in [34] by improving the selection of the verifiers 
based on Load, Distrust Value, and Distance. Simulation 
results have shown improvements in performance metrics as 
compared to those shown in [34].  
    In [37], Yao et al. derived a solution for the detection of 
selfish nodes for Quality of Service and Optimized Link State 
Routing (QOS-OLSR). Each car utilises three parameters of 
trust. Every vehicle estimates its direct trust value to its 
neighbour’s vehicle. Then a recommendation value is 
calculated based on a previously calculated trust value. 
Thirdly the comprehensive trust value is made by combining 
the direct trust value and recommendation value. If a 
vehicle’s comprehensive calculated trust value is less than 
the threshold, then the neighbour vehicle is declared as an 
attacker. 
    In [38], Wahab et al. used the concept of watchdog 
technique to detect selfish behaviors with a Black Hole. The 
technique proposed has got five phases. The first phase is 
known as the reputation phase for calculation. In this phase, 
initial reputation values are given to the vehicles. Multipoint 
Relay (MPR) vehicles are chosen by the cluster heads to 
forward data to different clusters. Next, is the watchdog 
phase for monitoring in which cluster members analyse the 
work of MPR nodes. The third phase is known as the voting 
phase based on aggregation, CH uses a voting technique and 
collects analysed data from the cluster members to check the 
trustworthiness of MPR. The fourth phase is the Tit for Tat 
phase for cooperation and regulation in which the reliability 
of MPR is checked by comparing it with a precalculated 
threshold value. The fifth phase is the information 
propagation phase, CH shares information about MPR to the 
cluster members and other CHs.  Based on this, a member 
vehicle marks those vehicles as a Black Hole which were 
determined as malicious. 
    In [39], Baiad et al. gave a solution by utilising a watchdog 
scheme in an efficient way in which monitoring has been 
deployed to both network and data link layers for the 
detection of a Black Hole that targets the Multipoint Relays 
(MPRs). Authors in [39] used the mechanism in [40] where 
the monitoring is deployed on the network layer to avoid a 
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wrong accusation of innocent nodes i.e. loss of packets, 
because of normal collisions. So to minimise the level of the 
false-positive ratio, the information about the detection of the 
attacks is further scanned with the help of data link 
monitoring. If the RTS sent are different from the CTS 
received, then packet losses have occurred due to the normal 
collisions. False positives escalated because of an increase in 
packet loss caused by the normal collision of legitimate 
nodes. In [41], the authors expanded their cross-layer 
detection scheme by merging the physical layer monitoring 
process side by side with the MAC and network layer 
monitoring.  
    In [42], Arwind et al. designed an algorithm for Gray and 
Black Hole nodes detection in MANETs. They implemented 
their security on the AODV MAC layer. They introduced two 
control packets, Response sequence (Rseq) and Code 
Sequence (Cseq). When any source wants to discover a route 
and access a channel, it first sends Cseq to all its neighbours, 
and in turn, the neighbour replies with Rseq. If both Cseq and 
Rseq match a particular neighbour then the connection to the 
network layer is established; otherwise, a source node 
discards that neighbour node and also informs others about 
that neighbour as a malicious node.  
    In [43], Li et al. gave a Trust Management Scheme in 
which the reliability of data in VANETs is evaluated by 
detecting the attacker nodes. In this algorithm, data was 
collected from various vehicles to make a prediction for data 
to be trusted. The solution is divided into two steps: analysis 
of data and management of the trust. In the analysis of data, 
data is collected from various vehicles and utilising 
Dempster-Shafer theory. 
    In [44], Alheeti et al. gave an intrusion detection system 
(IDS) for the detection of DoS and Black Hole attacks in 
VANETs. This work was proposed for the security of 
communication in autonomous cars. The algorithm is based 
on Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) and Quadratic 
Discriminant Analysis (QDA) for the prediction of the 
attack, which is based on the observation of the vehicle’s 
behaviour. The results were generated by carrying out data 
fuzzification, which indicated the behaviour of different 
vehicles as normal or malicious. After the detection process, 
different mobility scenarios were generated. 
    In [45], Alheeti et al. developed an Intrusion Detection 
System (IDS) which was dependent on a dataset gathered 
from the trace files that were extracted by running the NS2 
coding in the VANET environment. Trace files were divided 
into “basic trace”, “internet protocol trace” and “AODV 
trace”. The characteristics extracted from the trace files were 
utilised to evaluate the proposed solution. These features 
were used as the criteria to decide whether the behaviour of 
vehicles is malicious or normal. A statistical method was 
used for feature extraction named Proportional Overlapping 
Scores (POS). 
    
    In [47], Cai et al. proposed a path based solution for Gray 
and Black Hole attack detection. In the proposed work, every 
node keeps a FwdPktBuffer. The algorithm executes over 
three stages. In the first stage, forwarded packets are added 
into the packet buffer, and the source node starts listening. In 
the second stage, when a neighbour forwards packets and is 
listened by the source node, the stored packets from the 
buffer of the source node will be released. In the third stage, 
the source node compares the overheard rate with the 
precalculated threshold value to declare the neighbour as a 
legitimate node or an attacker, who continuously drops the 
data packets. 
    In [48], Tyagi et al. introduced a three-phase algorithm for 
the detection of Black Hole. Under the first phase, RSU plays 
the role of a certificate authority (CA) which maintains and 
generates a public and private key as well as certificates for 
the vehicles. Before the start of any communication, vehicles 
have to be verified from the RSU. In the second phase, the 
source broadcasts RREQ along with the correct certificate, 
nonce encryption, and destination’s public key. The 
destination sends RREP back with the source’s public key. 
In the third phase, Black Hole vehicles are detected based on 
the threshold of the destination sequence numbers, extracted 
from the RREPs, which are stored in the data structure used 
in the algorithm called Heaps. 
III. MATHEMATICAL PROOF OF VEHICLE’S ISOLATION 
FROM COMMUNICATION UNDER BLACK HOLE 
ATTACK 
In this section, we present the mathematical modeling of the 
Black Hole attack with emphasis placed upon vehicle 
isolation and presence attributes during the attack. 
A. SYSTEM SCENARIO ASSUMPTIONS AND 
SUPPOSITIONS 
In our work, we assume that all vehicles are equally 
distributed in an urban scenario over a 2-dimensional area. 
The radius of transmission r is the same for all vehicles. 
Vehicle v is considered as a neighbour node of vehicle u, if 
and only if, a distance of transmission between them is  r. 
All vehicles have a constant speed. Source and destination 
within 2 hops having three lanes are considered, as shown in 
Figure 3. By taking 2-hops, each vehicle is supposed to 
detect the attacker within 2-hop cars surrounding, which 
eliminates the probability for a high-speed attacker to escape 
the range before detection. All vehicles run a single 
algorithm that participates in communication. It is assumed 
that there is little or even no intervention of humans in 
driving. We further assume two types of vehicles named 
Black Hole and Cooperative. Cooperative vehicles are those 
that follow the instructions of routing protocol in the route 
discovery process and data packets forwarding. In contrast, 
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Black Hole vehicles violate the instructions of the routing 
protocol, hence drop data packets. T(V) is used to denote a 
network, where  
 
V = VC U VB   (1) 
 
FIGURE 3. System Scenario
TABLE 1. Comparison among Various Black Hole Detection Techniques 
 
Author, Publisher, and 
year 
Detection 
Techniques  
Scenario/Citations Simulators Used Performance Metrics Limitations 
Hortelano et al. IEEE 
(2010) [32] 
Watchdog based 
IDS 
VANET/85 CASTADIVA False positive and false 
negative 
High false detection rate 
Delkesh et al. Springer 
(2019) [33] 
Heuristic approach 
using Fake 
Destination IP 
Address 
MANET/12 NS-2.34 PDR, E2E, overhead, 
packet loss rate, and 
throughput 
Algorithm fails if network is 
being scanned by the 
attacker using a network 
analyser. Also, hop count is 
not mentioned 
Daeinabi et al. Springer 
(2013) [34] 
DMV VANET/61 Not mentioned PDR and packet 
duplication 
High jitter and high E2E 
Kadam et al. Springer 
(2014) [35] 
D&PMV VANET/7 NS-2 Average throughput, 
packets dropped, E2E and 
jitter 
Consumes more time for 
processing 
Uzma et al. Springer 
(2015) [36] 
DMN VANET/71 NS-2 Average throughput, 
PDR, and E2E 
The technique may be 
enhanced for isolation 
process 
Yao et al. Elsevier 
(2017) [37] 
Entity-Centric Trust 
Model 
VANET/54 VanetMobiSim PDR, average path length, 
and E2E 
Data trust model can be 
improved in utility and 
default parameters 
Wahab et al. Springer 
(2014) [38] 
Dempster-Shafer 
Based Tit-for-Tat 
VANET/25 Matlab-
9.0,VanetMobiSim 
False negative and 
detection rates 
Extra processing is required 
Baiad et al. IEEE (2014) 
[39] 
Novel cross-layer 
intrusion detection 
VANET/17 Matlab-8.0 False positive and 
detection rates 
Detection rates can be 
increased by adding 
physical and transport layer 
monitoring 
Arwind et al. Elsevier 
(2015) [42] 
MAC layer 
monitoring using 
Control packets 
MANET/34 NS-2 PDR and E2E High routing overhead 
Li et al. IEEE (2016) [43] ART  VANET/209 GloMoSim-2.03 Precision and Recall High processing overhead 
when no.of malicious 
nodes increases 
Alheeti et al. Elsevier 
(2017) [44] 
Linear Quadratic 
Discriminant 
Analysis with data 
Fuzzification  
VANET 
(Autonomous 
Vehicles)/17 
NS-2, SUMO, 
MOVE 
PDR, E2E, average 
throughput, false 
positive, false negative, 
true positive, and true 
negative rates 
Error rates can be reduced 
by enhancing RSU’s with 
intelligent IDS and cars 
using AI techniques 
Alheeti et al. IEEE 
(2015) [45] 
Proportional 
Overlapping Scores 
(POS) 
VANET 
(Autonomous 
Vehicles)/44 
NS-2, SUMO, 
MOVE 
False positive rate, false 
negative rate, true 
positive rate, and true 
negative rate 
System needs extra 
memory resources 
Kumar et al. Elsevier 
(2015) [46] 
Sequence Number 
threshold-based 
MANET/51 NS-2.34 Packet delivery ratio and 
throughput 
Can be improved by adding 
the threshold for Hop 
Count with the Sequence 
Number 
Cai et al. IEEE (2010) 
[47] 
Path-based 
detection algorithm 
Wireless Ad Hoc 
Networks/127 
NS-2 Packet delivery rate, 
collision rate, detection 
rate, and false positive 
rate 
Less rate of competitive 
detection 
Tyagi et al. Springer 
(2018) [48] 
ES-AODV VANET/5 NCTUns PDR, E2E, routing 
overhead, average 
throughput, packets 
dropped, and packet 
collision 
Security for RSU’s may be 
deployed to avoid 
compromisation of 
certificates and key pairs of 
the vehicles 
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B. VEHICLE BEHAVIOR’S STOCHASTIC PROPERTIES 
A random process is defined to be a Markov process if for a 
given value of W(t), the value of W(a) for a > t does not 
depend on the values of W(b) for b < t [49]. This means 
future results of the process do not depend on past values but 
present values. If a stochastic or random process at time tn is 
state Wn, the future state Wn+1 at time tn+1 depends only on 
the present state Wn and not on the past states Wn-1, Wn-
2,......., W0. The sequence of states {Wn} is called a Markov 
chain. Any vehicle can be modeled according to the proposed 
model as in the connected state (CS) and isolated state (IS). 
A vehicle can be either in any one of these states in the 
presence of Black Hole. A two-state Markov model is given 
in Figure 4. Variables x and y for the vehicle K at time instant 
i are formally defined as:  
 
x = P[Ki = IS|Ki-1 = CS]   (2) 
 
 y = P[Ki = CS|Ki-1 = IS]  
 
 
FIGURE 4. Network Node’s 2-State Transition Model. 
So the state of K as any instant i is given by 
Ki = {
CS, if y = VC ≥ 1 and x = VB = 0
IS, otherwise
  (3) 
where VC and VB represent the number of Cooperative and 
Blackhole vehicles. 
    Let’s suppose that the probability of the two-state model 
be PS = [PCS , PIS]. By solving a set of linear equations (2) 
and (3), this vector can be obtained. 
 
 D. PS = PS                (4) 
Here probability transition matrix is represented by D. 
 
PCS + PIS = 1   (5) 
 
TABLE 2. 2-State Markov Chain’s Probability Transition 
Matrix. 
 
State Connected Isolated 
Connected 1 – x x 
Isolated y   1 – y  
 
 
 
 
By comparing and solving equations (4) and (5) we get 
 
PCS =
y
x+y
   and  PIS =
x
x+y
  (6) 
From (6) we can say that PCS =
VC
VC+VB
= PC and PIS =
VB
VC+VB
= PB.  
C. VEHICLE’S ISOLATION UNDER BLACK HOLE 
ATTACK (PROBABILISTIC MODELING) 
1. LEMMA  
A vehicle V is isolated from the network if at least it has one 
Black Hole neighbour, provided it has n neighbours [49]. 
 
According to Lemma, let V(IS) denotes that the vehicle is in 
an isolated state, then, the vehicle probability being in the 
isolated state provided that the vehicle has neighbours is 
given by: 
 
 Pr(V(IS) | D(v) = d) = Pr(VB ≥ 1) = 1 − (1 − PB)
d    (7) 
D. VEHICLE’S CONNECTIVITY PROBABILISTIC MODEL 
WITH THE NETWORK 
A vehicle is in the connected state with the network if it has 
q-cooperative neighbours where1 ≤ q ≤ d. Given vehicle v  
with degree D(v) = d, v is said to be in a q-connected state to 
the network if D(c,v) = q which is only true if v has q 
cooperative neighbours and no Black Hole neighbours where 
D(c,v) denotes the degree of cooperation of vehicle v. Hence 
the probability of vehicle v being q connected provided D(v) 
= d is given by: 
Pr(D(c,v) = q|D(v) = d) = Pr(VC = q, VB = 0|D = d) (8) 
 
According to Binomial Distribution 
 
Pr(D(c,v) = q|D(v) = d) = (
d
q
) PC
𝑞
       (9) 
 
Where the probability of cooperative neighbours is 
represented by PC = 1 − P𝐁  which can also be written as 
  
Pr(V(CS)|D(v) = d) = (
d
q
) PC
𝑞
  (10)
  
 
Suppose that N number of vehicles exist in a network M, then 
the condition which is necessary to be fulfilled for a network 
to remain in the q-connected state is that every vehicle must 
have at least q cooperative neighbours. Hence the probability 
for a vehicle to have at minimum q cooperative neighbours 
is given by: 
Pr(D(c,v) ≥ q) = {1 − Pr(D(c,v) < 𝑞)}
N
 (11)
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1. POISSON’S MODEL TO PROVE MAXIMUM NETWORK 
CONNECTIVITY WHEN PB=0 
To calculate neighbour vehicle’s distribution Pr(D(u)=d), we 
split a network of area A into N smaller blocks where each 
block size is equal to the vehicle’s physical size and N 
represents the number of vehicles in area A. The distribution 
of Poisson can be used to model a vehicle’s distribution as 
given: 
Pr(D(v) = d) =
𝜇d
d
e−𝜇     (12) 
Where an average number of vehicles is denoted by 𝜇 within 
the area and vehicle’s transmission range. Value of 𝜇 =
𝜌𝜋𝑟2 and 𝜌 =
𝑁
𝐴
 which denotes the vehicle’s density in the 
network of area A. 
Applying the Total Probability Law on (9) and (12), we get 
Pr(D(c,v) = q|D(v) = d) = ∑ (
d
q
) (1 − PB)
q  
𝜇d
d
e−𝜇
N−1
d=q
 
(13) 
Pr(D(c,v) < q) can be derived using (13) as follows: 
 
Pr(D(c,v) < 𝑞|D(v) = d) ≈ ∑ ∑ (
d
m
) (1 − PB)
m  
𝜇d
d
e−𝜇
N−1
d=q
q−1
m=0
 
  (14) 
 
                                     ≈
𝚪(𝐪,𝝁(𝟏−𝐏𝐁))
𝚪(𝐪)
    (15) 
 
To obtain the probability of a vehicle to have at least q 
cooperative degree vehicles, substituting (15) in (11) as 
follows: 
  
Pr(D(c,v) ≥ q) = {1 −
𝚪(𝐪,𝝁(𝟏−𝐏𝐁))
𝚪(𝐪)
}
N
      (16) 
Where  
Γ(𝛼, 𝛽) = (𝛼 − 1)! 𝑒−𝛽 ∑ (
𝛽𝑖
𝑖!
)
𝛼−1
𝑖=0
 
𝛼 𝜖 𝑁 gives the incomplete gamma function and Γ(𝑞) =
(𝑞 − 1)! gives the complete gamma function. 
Nevertheless, the network can have maximum connectivity 
if and only if PB = 0 provided that A, N, and q have fixed 
values. 
IV. PROPOSED TECHNIQUE 
Our proposed solution IDBA uses four main parameters in 
which two of them are sequence number and hop count. The 
Black Hole exploits these two to damage the availability and 
integrity of the network. The other two parameters are 
outputs of the network performance that are degraded as a 
result of the attack on the first two parameters. So by 
combining these four parameters and precalculating the 
thresholds regarding the future actions of the Black Hole, we 
achieved to detect the attack according to Algorithm 1 more  
 
efficiently as compared to others’ work. IDBA process is 
shown in Figure 5. 
 
 
FIGURE 5. IDBA detection process 
 
A. IDBA DETECTION PARAMETERS 
 
1) SEQUENCE NUMBER 
The sequence number is one of the main metrics of AODV 
based on which a node decides which route it has to mark 
fresh to transmit its data. Black Hole compromises this 
metric by setting the destination sequence number to a 
maximum possible value to elude the source to believe that 
a different node than the legitimate should be the next hop. 
Algorithm 2 has been used to find the threshold for the 
destination sequence number and make the distinction 
between an attack or not manifested in the network. Any 
Precalculations of the destination sequence numbers 
generated both by the normal nodes and the malicious nodes 
are done according to Algorithm 2. 
2) HOP COUNT 
The second main metric considered in our work is the hop 
count value. Lower count leads to a fresher route. A Black 
Hole advertises this metric as low as 2 side by side with the 
destination sequence number to the source to mark itself as 
next-hop [50]. 
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3) PACKET DELIVERY RATIO AND END TO END DELAY 
The threshold values for these two parameters are calculated 
according to the procedure adopted in [33]. Advantage has 
been taken of the claim made by the authors that their 
solution can also be considered for a majority of ad hoc 
networks under the hierarchy of which ACVs also fall [51]-
[54]. 
 
Algorithm 1: Black Hole Detection 
1. Input: n, αth, βth, γth, Hc, ID_RREPz _B 
2. begin 
               for(i=1; i<=n; i++) 
                       if {(DS_RREPz > αth) && (Hc == 2)} then 
3.               G ← RREPz     
                    goto step 5 
                      else 
4.     goto start 
                      end  
5.             if {(PDR < βth) && (E2E > γth)} then 
6.                   B ← G 
7.                   RREQ ← ID_RREPz _B  
8.                   Alarm ← RREQ 
9.                   Flood Alarm 
                       else 
10.                 AODV(); 
                       end  
            end 
end 
 
 
Algorithm 2: Sequence Number Threshold Precalculation 
1. Input: Sum, z, DS_RREPz , DS_RREQ, n  
2. start 
3.        Sum ← 0 
               for each reply [z] do 
                        if  (DS_RREPz > DS_RREQ) then 
4.             D ← DS_RREPz – DS_RREQ 
5.                 Sum ← Sum+D 
  D ← 0 
                      else 
6.               AODV(); 
                     end  
             end 
7.         αth ←
Sum
n
  
  end 
 
 
V. SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT, PARAMETERS, AND 
RESULTS 
Simulations are performed for our proposed technique using 
NS2 (v2.34) network simulator 2. We compared our 
approach with B-AODV, Ids-AODV, and EAODV 
algorithms. EAODV was offered for MANETs. However, 
authors of [33] additionally claimed that the technique could 
be applied to a vast majority of ad hoc networks. Advantage 
has been taken of their argument as discussed in the previous 
paragraph, and results are compared to [33]. Also, if the 
attacker had scanned a network, EAODV would have failed, 
would not be the case when IDBA was considered in the 
same scenario.  
 
TABLE 3. Notations and Descriptions. 
Notations D  E  S  C  R  I  P  T  I  O  N  S 
VB Black Hole vehicles 
VC Cooperative vehicles 
V Total number of Black Hole and Cooperative vehicles 
PCS Probability of a vehicle in a connected state 
PIS Probability of a vehicle in an isolated state 
PS 
Total probability of a vehicle either in a connected or 
isolated state 
PC Probability of Cooperative vehicles 
PB Probability of Black Hole vehicles 
VIS Vehicle in an isolated state 
VCS Vehicle in a connected state 
D(V) Degree of a vehicle connected with the network 
D(C, V) 
Degree of a vehicle connected with the cooperative 
vehicles of the network 
𝜇 The average number of vehicles 
𝜌 Vehicle density 
 
TABLE 4. Notations and Descriptions. 
Notations D    E    S    C    R    I    P    T    I    O    N    S 
RREQ Route Request 
RREP Route Reply 
RREPz 
Route Reply generated by a node who received 
RREQ  
D 
The difference of sequence number generated by 
a neighbour and source  
DS_RREQz 
The sequence number of destination generated by 
a neighbour  
DS_RREQ 
Sequence number of destination generated by a 
source 
ID_RREPz_B  The ID of the attacker in the fake route reply sent 
by the Black Hole  
Hc Hop count 
αth , Th1 The threshold value for the Sequence number 
βth , Th3 The threshold value for PDR 
γ
th
 , Th4 Threshold value for E2E 
G Variable to mark node in Gray List 
B Variable to mark Gray Listed node in Black List 
n Total number of vehicles/nodes 
PS Total number of packets sent 
PR Total number of packets received 
TA Arrive Time 
TS Sent Time 
C Total number of connections 
Th2 The threshold value for Hop count 
IN Intermediate Node 
SPN Suspicious Node 
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A. Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) 
PDR is the ratio of the total number of data packets received 
to the total number of data packets sent as given in Eq. 17. 
 
 PDR =  
∑ PR
∑ PS
    (17) 
B. End-to-End Delay (E2E) 
E2E is the average time required for the data packets to be 
delivered from the source to the destination, as shown in Eq. 
18. 
 
 E2E =
∑(TA−TS)
∑ C
    (18) 
C. Routing overhead (ROH) 
ROH is defined as the number of packets that need to be 
processed and routed during network communication. 
 
D. Throughput 
It is the average number of data packets delivered to the 
destination by the source. 
 
E. Packet loss rate (PLR) 
PLR is defined as the difference between the data packets 
sent to the data packets received. 
 
             PLR = ∑ PS - ∑ PR   (19) 
 
   
FIGURE 6. Packet delivery ratio in BAODV, idsAODV, EAODV and IDBA  
 
FIGURE 7. Throughput in BAODV, idsAODV, EAODV and IDBA 
 
TABLE 5. Simulation parameters 
Parameters Values 
Standard Protocol 802.11p 
Simulation environment 1000m x 1000m 
Number of vehicles 50 , 60, 70, 80 
Black Hole Attackers Max. 4 
Simulation time 500s 
Vehicle’s speed Max. 30 m/s 
Packets size 512b/s 
Routing Agent UDP/CBR 
Range of Transmission 250 m 
Base Routing Protocol AODV 
The threshold used for the packet delivery ratio 35,000 packets 
The threshold used for end to end delay 0.01 s 
FIGURE 8. End-to-End delay in BAODV, idsAODV, EAODV and IDBA 
 
FIGURE 9. The packets loss rate in BAODV, idsAODV, EAODV and IDBA 
 
    Fig. 6 shows the variations in the PDR according to the 
number of nodes and gives a maximum value when nodes 
are 60. Nevertheless, for every node check, IDBA gives a 
high PDR rate than EAODV and other algorithms. 
Variations in the values of PDR are due to the network 
conditions. There were pre-defined thresholds used in our 
technique to check whether the path is clear from the attack, 
for the packets which are to be routed to the destination. 
Simulation results in Fig. 6 show that PDR with IDBA gives 
better results as compared to other algorithms.  
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FIGURE 10. Routing overhead in BAODV, idsAODV, EAODV and IDBA  
    High PDR gives low E2E and optimal throughput. It is 
thus specifically evaluated in Fig, 7, and Fig. 8 that E2E and 
throughput give optimised results where PDR was higher in 
Fig. 6. This means that maximum packets are transmitted to 
the destination with less latency as compared to EAODV and 
other algorithms.  
    Fig. 9 shows the number of packets dropped. Since in 
BAODV, there were 4 malicious nodes without a detection 
algorithm, so the dropped packets reached 89%. IDBA, when 
under attack, gave a lower packet dropped rate as compared 
to BAODV and two detection algorithms i.e. idsAODV and 
EAODV. This can also be analysed from Fig.6 as the greater 
the PDR, the lower will be the rate of packets dropped. 
    Fig. 10 indicates that IDBA requires less number of 
packets that needs to be routed for network communication 
and hence reduces processing overhead as compared to other 
algorithms. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
Detection of the Black Hole attacks is becoming an 
indispensable issue with the exponential increase in car 
automation. Black Hole directly impacts communication, 
which is unacceptable when it comes to ACVs, where delay 
even in a single data packet can cause accidents. Thus, the 
deterring of these attacks is imperative. 
    To ensure secure autonomous vehicular applications, i.e. 
comfort, safety, and transport of the vehicles and passengers, 
we proposed and tested our solution which gave more 
satisfactory results in terms of PDR, E2E, PLR, ROH, and 
Throughput against existing solutions. For this reason, our 
technique could be deployed for real-world scenarios that 
would minimise the number of accidents.     
    The proposed technique can be enhanced by combining 
smart clustering techniques to deter Black Hole Attacks.  
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